You and number of poor souls are idling in your cars at a very red light. While you sit there, contemplating whether or not you'll have to attend another meeting at work today - a frail man with a long white beard, grime cacked skin, and tattered clothes weaves between the stopped automobiles. A plastic cup from a nearby fast-food joint you recognize accompanies him, which he motions towards each car he passes. As you look around, surveying the drivers, you notice some shaking their heads as he approaches. But many stare straight ahead like stone statues. As though the man walking amongst the sea of 2-ton vehicles wasn't even there. They do not look at him - as if they were the Royal Queen's guard. But what are they protecting? What is it they feel the need to defend? Why ignore the impoverished man when most people would agree poverty and homelessness are bad and something should be done about it? Is it fear? Or are our morals askew? I think the answer to this can be found in Peter Singer's paper aptly titled paper: Affluence, Famine, and Morality.
Peter Singer is a fantastic writer with what would seem to be (from the content of his paper) a man of strong opinions concerning how our morality interacts with situations of large scale, or small scale, human suffering. This is what lies at the heart of his paper. He explores how human morality, for all it's supposed good, has some dark spots when it comes to the suffering of others, and perhaps a new conceptual schema of morality is required to address this.
Famine and affluence
Singer begins his paper with a rather large-scale issue. That is, the people of East Bengal dying en masse due to a lack of food, shelter, and medical care (Singer 229). This famine led to the deaths of an estimated 3 million people and displaced just as many (Center). Deaths, that at the time in 1971, Singer believed to be entirely preventable. But how exactly?
Singer strongly believed that the decisions and actions of human beings could prevent the suffering like that present in East Bengal. However, not only did he notice a disproportionate lack of aid from countries with a GDP bordering the excessive compared to their own spending at home, but he also noticed a lack of recognition or significant response from the general populace (Singer 229).
Although the scale is quite large, Singer does not ignore the fact that these attitudes and lack of aid are also present in many parts of the world, perhaps at a smaller scale (Singer 231). Nevertheless, the difference between situations like East Bengal and something as seemingly benign as assisting a homeless person is only the scale. Suffering of such magnitude in East Bengal is almost impossible for both the individual and governments to ignore (Singer 231). And yet, not much had been done at the time. It is the action of inaction that makes Singer call into question our morals in the face of suffering. Because of this, Singer argues that our current moral conceptual schema is lacking. That the reaction to the situation in East Bengal (and other instances of suffering) by the relatively affluent cannot be justified (Singer 230). And as such, needs to be altered.
The formal argument: Morality
Hopefully, I have laid out the context and reasoning behind Singer writing his paper. But to deepen the understanding of his thoughts on the matter, it is important to analyze his formal argument. That is, the premises he asserts and the conclusion that follows from said premises.
Premise 1: Suffering is bad
The least controversial of his premises. There isn't much to say concerning it, besides that those who refute this premise are not engaging in the same conversation.
As Singer said, "Those who disagree need read no further." (Singer 231)
Premise 2: If it is within our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral value, we should morally do so
Perhaps his most contentious premise. There are a number of arguments that may be levied against it. But for now, it is easier to understand it in its failure.
That is, if one could prevent say, a robbery, but it requires them to sacrifice their life, there is not moral imperative to do so.
Conclusion: Everyone should do what they ought to do
This is rather vague on the surface without fleshing out the previous premise. But to quickly explain, it essentially means that if our moral schema was based upon premise 2, then many of our actions should be reclassified from acts of charity or simply heroism to duties.
This requires more explanation to become fully clear, as the word ought may cause some to raise their eyebrows. (No one enjoys being told what to do)
Premise 2
Explanation
We shall start with a further analysis of premise 2 and skip premise 1, since, as stated before, there really is not much to say concerning it. To reiterate, premise 2 is that "If it is within our power to prevent something bad, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it." (Singer 231).
This premise is something I think most of us could agree with. It essentially asks us to make sacrifices to prevent something bad (suffering) so long as the sacrifice doesn't cause anything else comparably bad, nor do something bad in itself. It only asks of us to prevent what is bad so long as we do not compromise something morally comparable. Singer provides a simple example that succinctly sums up his idea with this premise.
"If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing." (Singer 231)
As you can see, this premise is not all that difficult to grasp especially when given a concrete example of it in action. To put it another way, we might say that the moral onus (the ought) to save the drowning child clearly outweighs the sacrifice of muddying one's clothing. Which is why if stopping a robber would cost someone's life, no one would find it morally reprehensible to not stop it. We can see this in real life with retail theft policies.
More on that here: Why Employees Shouldn’t Stop Shoplifters
Arguments raised
There are a few potential arguments that could arise from premise 2, but Singer handles these rather well.
- One argument might be that premise 2 does not necessarily specify how it should be implemented in relation to distance. For it is all well and good to save the drowning child, but this is only because they are right in front of us and the action to help is obvious. How is sending aid to a foreign country similar?
Singer replies to this sentiment by calling to attention the fact that although the drowning child is in front of us, this does not inform whether we ought to save them. Rather, it only increases the chance of it occurring. To not extend premise 2 past one's immediate boundaries would be to discriminate how we engage with instances of suffering based on distance, rather than other forms of discrimination we typically find morally wrong such as race, gender, and sex. (Singer 232)
- Some further points of contention can be asked in questions such as these: What about the sheer number of people suffering in East Bengal? Should what we ought to do not shift in respect to the amount of people suffering? How can I, as an individual, possibly have a moral imperative to fix a problem so large?
For this point, Singer responds that just because there are millions of other people in the same position as him (affluent or generally well off) who could help, it still is not very different from a scenario wherein only one person can prevent something bad from happening. Returning to the child drowning example, Singer points out that if there were many people of equal distance from the drowning child, should he then consider that he is less obliged to help just because there are others not doing so? There is only a psychological difference between the two scenarios, which can best be understood as essentially the bystander effect. With this in mind, it seems absurd to posit that inaction is morally permissible. There is more to discuss about certain aspects of this premise, and I will address some as I address Singer's conclusion.
Conclusion
What we ought to do
With a good baseline of premise 2 and clarifications on some points of confusion, we arrive at Singer's conclusion - that in order for people to do what they ought to do, we must restructure out classifications for what we consider charity and duty. Returning to the issue of East Bengal, Singer noted that numbers only mattered if every person, in circumstances like Singer's, was giving $6 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be adequate aid; and therefore, no reason to give more than any other. But this is purely hypothetical. In reality, it is far more likely that not everyone in circumstances like Singer's will give $6. Which leads Singer to conclude that by giving more than $6 we might prevent more suffering, and therefore what we ought to do is give as much as we can, so long as it does not cause ourselves or those dependent on us harm (this is the comparable moral sacrifice in this instance). (Singer 234)
Another way to conceptualize this is perhaps in how many people approach environmentalism. Because so many people are involved with impacting the environment, the individual might ignore the moral onus, what Singer will call duty, to do the best they can - given what they are capable of sacrificing. Since, not only do they think their contribution will have no meaningful impact but also because many are not doing contributing as well. In this case we might consider the environment the drowning child, and our actions to save/help it jumping in and muddying our clothes
More concrete information about attitudes towards climate her: Why Nobody Cares About The Environment | Pick Ethical
Let's return to Singer's 2nd premise. If it is sound, and it is the case that if it is within our power to prevent something bad, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it; the outcome is that our current moral categories are incongruent with the premises.
What Singer means is that our current distinctions between what we call charity (giving money to Bengal relief fund for instance) and duty cannot be clearly drawn in the way we do now. We can observe that someone who gives to charity is deemed admirable, but the person who doesn't is not condemned. Also, no one feels ashamed or guilty when using their money for unnecessary wants instead of needs, in fact, we very often rationalize any shame or guilt we feel about doing so. Singer plainly uses the word "wants" in his paper, but I believe having some wants is okay. It is only in excess where the problems begin. When our wants outweigh the suffering of others, that we ought to prevent, do I find wants instead of providing aid morally unjustified.
By not choosing to give money away and instead using it for frivolous wants, we are essentially reinforcing the same paradigm present in my previous robbery scenario. The instance where Premise 2 fails.
When we choose not to give excess money to Bengal (stop the robber), we are saying that our frivolous wants (our lives) are not worth sacrificing. This is why when someone gives to charity (stopping the robber anyway), we find them admirable and why when someone does not, we do not morally condemn. If we map this same scenario on an instance where premise 2 succeeds, we find how our distinction between charity and duty is incompatible with premise 2.
When we choose to give money to Bengal (save the drowning child) we are positing that giving away our money (muddying our clothes) is not a morally comparable sacrifice, so we ought to do it.
In this vein, we can see how giving money away is something we ought to do, rather than what we currently define as charity.
There is much about this conclusion that could be said, as Singer addresses a number of different objections. But I believe no counter argument serves stronger than the one he gives in response to the idea that his position calls for too radical a shift.
"My conclusion follows from the principle which I have advanced earlier, and unless that principle is rejected, or arguments shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must stand, however strange it appears." (Singer 236)
The duty to prevent suffering
So, what were those addled stone statues protecting in their cars? Why pretend the old man wasn't even there? Were they scared he would harm them? Or was it something else? After reading this blog I hope you can see how Singer might have our answer. They might just have been protecting our current moral schema. The clear distinction between charity and duty. Because the act of providing aid to the homeless man is viewed as an act of charity, shame and guilt do not accompany inaction. No one will be condemned if they do not roll down their window and hand him a dollar. But if everyone did, if each person did what they ought to do, perhaps the man would receive significant help to lessen his suffering. Poverty, overpopulation, pollution - are problems in which we are all involved (Singer 233). Tackling these issues requires the will of the many. And each of our individual actions shape this will. When we choose inaction, when we ignore preventable suffering, we are still making a choice - that things are fine the way they are.
"The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption and freedom of the penniless." - Ambrosius, Decretum Gratiani
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